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Introduction
Reaching the European decarbonisation objectives will 
require a higher contribution of electricity generation 
from variable renewable energies, as well as the 
electrification of other sectors such as heat, transport, 
and gas. Future decarbonised systems will therefore 
impose new challenges in terms of flexibility, but they 
also will provide access to new, more-flexible solutions, 
provided the right market design is put in place to 
facilitate them.
Existing markets designs, with a few minor adjustments, 
could, in most cases, provide the needed flexibility 
to ensure optimal short-term dispatch, reliability 
and long-term capacity adequacy. However, in high-
residual load periods, there is a need for better scarcity 
pricing to solve the missing money problem.
In this paper, we combine a premium that strengthens 
scarcity prices and a mechanism that significantly 
mitigates the risk on the investment side, while 
effectively sharing it with consumers. Our vision 
for a future electricity market uses a combination of 
plausible approaches to support flexibility. It aims to 
address the framework conditions necessary to activate 
flexible resources based on: i) renewable energy-based 
wholesale market designs; ii) cross-sectoral coupling; 
and iii) innovative scarcity pricing and risk reductions 
through reliability options. 
Our proposed vision improves the design of electricity 
markets and establishes new sets of frameworks that 
support flexibility as the core element in a decarbonised 
energy system with a large share of variable renewable 
energies.
The future power market
European energy markets are going through a green 
transition toward a future with a decarbonised 
energy system. Centralised, fossil-intensive electricity 
generation is being replaced by decentralised renewable 
energy. A large share of variable renewable energy (VRE) 
sources, especially wind and solar, will be deployed, 
in addition to other traditional storable renewable 
energy sources, such as biomass and hydropower. By 
nature, the temporal supply of VRE is highly variable 
because it depends on weather conditions, uncertainty 
due to forecasting errors and location specificities, as 
the primary energy source cannot be transported, like 
coal or biomass (Borenstein, 2012; Hirth et al., 2015). 
Such properties point to major VRE integration and 
flexibility challenges for the future energy system. 
Simultaneously, the traditional and flexible fast-
responding, fossil-based peak-generators are being 
phased out, increasing flexibility challenges. 
Future European energy systems should be consistent 
with the threefold targets set to improve competition, 
reliability, and sustainability (see Figure 1). Existing 
power markets were created before or simultaneously 
with setting up the EU goal of developing an Internal 
Energy Market, which facilitate low consumer prices 
through competition and reliability by matching 
electricity demand and supply (EU Directive 2009/72/
EC). The market design that emerged over the years 
might have to be adapted according to the green 
transition such that it enables necessary short- and 
long-term flexibility in the system.
The future market design should be based not on 
the perspectives of the traditional electricity sector, 
but rather on an integrated decarbonised energy 
system in which electricity becomes a cornerstone 
in the sustainable energy transition for other energy 
sectors – such as heat and gas – as well as for transport 
and other service sectors with a large share of 
electrification (Skytte, Pizarro and Karlsson, 2017b). 
The progressive coupling between the electricity sector 
and the other sectors will increase the volumes traded 
on the electricity market, as well as competition that 
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ultimately will benefit consumers. If sector coupling is 
done in a ‘smart’ way, it also may increase the flexibility 
of the system – especially on the demand side – by 
unleashing the potential for electrification via flexible 
load units with ramping capabilities such as electric 
boilers in heating systems, electrolysers in power-to-
gas or smart charging of electric vehicles (Skytte et al., 
2017a; Ropenus and Skytte, 2007). 
Though increased flexibility, thanks to cross-
sectoral coupling, will play a key role in reaching 
decarbonisation targets, the right market design will be 
required to ensure a high level of short-term reliability 
and long-term capacity adequacy at the lowest cost.
Price setting in energy 
markets
In most of the present power markets, the wholesale 
electricity price is determined according to the 
marginal cost of the last dispatched generation plant 
(see left panel in Figure 2). It has been shown to be 
a very effective market design that so far has entailed 
energy prices that both support optimal dispatch/
short-term reliability (Skytte and Grohnheit, 2017) 
and optimal investment/long-term capacity adequacy 
(Biggar and Hesamzadeh, 2014; Green, 2006; 
Schweppe et al., 1988). Although only energy is traded 
on the power markets, flexibility is valued, as demand 
and generation units with flexible ramping capabilities 
can make a better business case in volatile markets, 
compared with slow ramping units.
The success of the existing design also must be seen in 
the context of a large deployment of renewable energy-
based capacity. This capacity has received additional 
financial support from outside the market, resulting 
in overcapacity on the supply side. Therefore, there 
is presently limited need for additional investment 
in conventional generation capacity. Nonetheless, 
with increased demand from sector coupling and the 
phasing out of fossil-based generation, additional 
generation capacity will be needed in the future. 
Simultaneously, support for renewables will be phased 
out in accordance with the maturing of technologies 
and it can be expected that future deployment will be 
mainly market-based (Skytte, 2000; Skytte, 2006; van 
Kuik et al., 2016). 
In a period with scarce supply – e.g., when the residual 
demand is large due to little wind or solar production 
and with simultaneously high demand – the price in 
the power market is likely to be set by the marginal 
consumer benefit (see right panel in Figure 2). This is 
called scarcity pricing. Scarcity is a necessary (although 
not a sufficient) condition for a well-functioning market 
and optimal allocation of resources – often referred to 
as the first principle of micro-economics. The main 
dilemma in the power market is that the current 
demand side is relatively price-inelastic (the demand 
Figure 1: Goals and framework of the future energy market
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curve D in Figure 2 is almost vertical), which implies 
that it is hard to determine a sufficient scarcity price. 
We call this missing flexibility on the consumer side the 
missing consumer problem, which may imply that the 
price does not reflect the marginal consumer benefit 
or, at worst, that an equilibrium between demand and 
supply cannot be found. Within energy economics, the 
marginal consumer benefit in scarcity periods is often 
estimated as the value of lost load (VOLL) for marginal 
consumers, i.e., the amount they are willing to pay to 
avoid a disruption in their electricity supply.
Electrification and sector coupling will increase 
electricity demand and might also increase the 
availability of flexible load units with ramping 
capabilities – and, thus, the marginal price elasticity 
needed to solve the missing consumer problem. 
However, the problem of determining an efficient 
level of scarcity pricing also affects the supply side. 
If the estimated VOLL is set too low, investments in 
new capacity may be withdrawn, leaving the market 
unable to ensure long-term adequacy. Lower prices in 
the power market increase the need for higher scarcity 
prices to ensure investment, as a low price level implies 
that a large share of the revenue to cover the investment 
costs must come from scarcity periods, when the price 
is higher than the marginal cost of the last generating 
unit (right panel in Figure 2). 
VRE, such as wind and solar, will be the main suppliers of 
electricity in the future, as more controllable renewable 
energy-based technologies such as hydropower and 
biomass involve more limited resources or are subject 
to restrictions on further deployment. The dominance 
of low marginal cost VRE technologies implies low 
average prices on the wholesale markets (Skytte and 
Grohnheit, 2017). As mentioned above, a low price 
level, combined with insufficient scarcity prices, could 
imply that potential investments in new capacity 
are withdrawn (Joskow, 2008; Joskow and Tirole, 
2007). This is called the missing money problem, i.e., 
the revenues in the energy market will not cover the 
needed investments in new capacity, thereby failing 
to ensure the long-term adequacy of the system. In 
addition, price caps have been implemented in many 
markets to protect consumers from high peak prices 
that might result from market forces. Such price caps 
will limit scarcity prices and contribute to the missing 
money problem. 
Need for re-design
The existing market design and its marginal pricing, 
with a few minor adjustments, works in most cases. 
However, in the event of scarcity, there is a need for 
better scarcity pricing to solve the missing consumer 
and missing money problems. 
The general problem is that market imperfections exist 
in the power market (Skytte, 1999). In addition, the 
uncertainty of future prices increases risks for investors 
and may, as a consequence, hinder new investments. 
Better risk-hedging possibilities for investors, in 
addition to the existing forward and other financial 
markets, may be required. 
Therefore, we do not support capacity mechanisms 
just to have enough capacity available, but rather to fix 
Figure 2: Price setting on the power market (RES = renewable energy sources)
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the existing scarcity-pricing problem in the energy-
only market – with as little interference from market 
mechanisms as possible – and to reduce investment 
risk.
In this paper, we propose a combination consisting of a 
premium that enforces scarcity prices and a mechanism 
that, to a certain extent, mitigates the risk on the 
investor side and effectively shares it with consumers. 
The constructed mechanisms draw on Hogan (2013) 
and Cramton et al. (2013). We introduce a premium 
in scarcity periods, and we also allow generators to sell 
reliability options that reduce their risk of investment. 
These two instruments work concurrently, with the 
premium increasing the revenue of generators, while 
the reliability options allow generators to swap revenue 
from the few high-price periods with a stable, risk-
free payment. The following subsections describe the 
premium and reliability options in turn.
Ensuring scarcity prices 
with premiums
One should seek a re-design of the energy markets that 
respects the first principle of economics in terms of 
scarcity. One way to do this is to strengthen scarcity 
prices through a premium based on the VOLL and the 
loss of load probability (LOLP). 
At times of high demand in the energy spot market, 
there will most often be sufficient capacity to clear 
the market because the system typically will contain 
a certain capacity margin. In this situation, there will 
be no scarcity and prices will stay at moderate levels, 
presumably at the short-run marginal cost of the most 
expensive unit in the market (left panel in Figure 2). 
The high demand for capacity may, however, create a 
tense situation regarding operating reserves that are 
retained at any given time to deal with unexpected 
events, such as a sudden increase in electricity demand 
or the loss of a generator or transmission line. Typically, 
the system operator would define an inelastic demand 
for operating reserves. When the reserve market does 
not clear itself, the only solution might be to shed load 
or to use other out-of-market transactions, both of 
which will not be reflected in the operating reserve or 
the spot-market prices. By defining a proper demand 
curve, such issues could be prevented and scarcity 
signals could be sent to all market participants. 
We propose using a downward-sloping, operating-
reserve demand curve (Figure 3), which is determined 
by the expected value of lost load (i.e., the product of 
loss of load probability and value of lost load; LOLP 
by VOLL) at any given time (Hogan, 2013). The more 
capacity available for operating reserves, the lower the 
LOLP, yielding the slope in the demand for reserves. 
This translates into an implicit premium (“price adder”) 
on top of the electricity price in scarcity periods (right 
illustration in Figure 3). The underlying assumption 
is that generators will be able to either supply energy 
to the spot market or stay available for reserves. 
With rising demand in the spot market, the available 
capacity for reserves will be smaller. Due to the shape 
of the operating reserve-demand curve, this may result 
in sharply rising reserve prices. Therefore, in scarcity 
periods, when the probability of loss of load is high, 
Figure 3: The downward-sloping Operating Reserve-Demand Curve (left figure) as a basis for a 
scarcity premium on energy prices (right figure)
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the implicit premium is correspondingly high, while 
in other periods, in which the probability is negligible, 
the premium is close to zero.
The resulting premiums provide generators with 
additional revenue, improving the incentive to invest in 
new capacity (mitigating the missing money problem) 
and at the same time providing a stronger price signal 
to the demand side, to which the consumers can react. 
However, the scarcity premium does not remove 
investor risk due to the uncertainty of future prices. 
Therefore, it is not certain whether the mechanism 
ensures sufficient capacity in practice. It could still be an 
important adjustment to the existing operating reserve 
markets, as the short-term price signals become more 
precise. While the profitability of investments would be 
improved, the cash-flow timing and investment risk are 
not addressed. We introduce reliability options to bridge 
the remaining gap to achieve adequate investments. 
Reliability options
Reliability options allow generators to swap revenue 
from a few scarcity periods with a stable, risk-free 
payment. We propose that the system operator 
organises annual auctions to buy a predetermined 
number of reliability options (corresponding to the 
expected future capacity needs) with a predetermined 
strike price and a time horizon that allows for the 
introduction of new capacity. When a generator sells a 
reliability option, it will still receive the spot price for 
the energy it produces, but only in those hours when 
the spot price is lower than the strike price (see Figure 
4). In all other hours (scarcity periods), it receives the 
strike price for the energy it produces. Note that in 
our case, the spot price includes the implicit premium 
stemming from the demand for operating reserves. 
In addition, the generator earns the selling price of 
the reliability options. Thus, the generator swaps the 
revenue it would have earned during the infrequent 
high price periods (i.e., above strike price) with a stable 
and risk-free payment for the reliability option. While 
the option payments compensate for the price risk 
during scarcity periods, market participants will still 
be fully exposed to price variations below the strike 
price. Standard forward contracts might, therefore, be 
used as a supplement to manage price risk below the 
strike price.
The advantage of reliability options is that they 
maintain the incentive for generators to produce 
electricity in scarcity periods, as the system operator 
sets the strike price such that it is above the marginal 
cost of the most expensive generation unit (resembling 
the scarcity situation in the right panel of Figure 2). 
Thus, any generator will earn a positive profit from 
producing electricity at the strike price. Just as under 
the option contract, a generator is obliged to pay the 
difference between spot and strike price whenever the 
strike price is exceeded, not producing in such an event 
will produce significant losses – a strong incentive to 
provide full capacity during scarcity events.
System reliability can, to a certain degree, be considered 
a public good. Improving reliability benefits all 
consumers because load curtailment at the individual 
level is currently not widely available. Thus, consumers 
have an incentive to free-ride and let others pay for 
improved system reliability. For this reason, we propose 
that system operators purchase reliability options 
on behalf of all consumers in a centralised auction 
and distribute the cost according to their respective 
shares of the load. In exchange, consumers receive a 
hedge against high electricity prices and inadequate 
capacity. This hedge against price peaks will have the 
same objective as present price caps which most likely 
Figure 4: Reliability options and the spot and strike prices
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will be removed in the future power market in order to 
allow for scarcity prices. Finally, from the point in time 
when the reliability option is sold until the contract 
takes effect, a few years will pass. This will allow new 
capacity to compete with existing capacity, as there will 
be time to construct new capacity between the auction 
and the delivery period. 
If load curtailment at the individual level becomes 
widely available, the centralised auction can be 
replaced with a market for reliability options, in which 
consumers can decide whether to buy or not. If they 
decide not to purchase, they will accept the risk being 
curtailed in case of scarcity.
Discussion
Why choose our proposed scarcity premium and 
reliability options instead of traditional capacity-
remuneration mechanisms? Different capacity-
remuneration mechanisms (Table 1) are often 
mentioned during discussions about adequacy 
concerns and as a means to minimise investor risk. 
However, conventional strategic reserves and capacity 
payments or markets (capacity obligations or auctions) 
exhibit some deficiencies that regulators prefer to avoid 
(Finon and Pignon, 2008; Traber, 2017). Strategic 
reserves, for instance, remunerate capacity, so that it 
remains available and can be dispatched in times of 
scarcity. Typically, strategic reserves are mainly targeted 
at existing capacity and do not have a direct impact on 
new investments. As a long-term mechanism to ensure 
adequacy, they are, thus, not applicable. Among other 
capacity-remuneration mechanisms, reliability options 
have an advantage in that contracted capacity provides 
a distinct incentive to be available during periods of 
scarcity, while it does not profit from extreme energy 
prices directly (Cramton et al., 2013). Therefore, 
potential issues with market power in the energy spot 
market can be avoided to some extent.
Texas has implemented a variant of scarcity prices 
based on the operating reserve demand curve (ERCOT 
2014), while a variant of reliability options has been 
implemented in the Colombian electricity market 
and in New England (Ausubel and Cramton 2010). 
However, to our knowledge, no one has combined the 
two approaches yet. 
Throughout this paper, we assume a future in which 
large-scale electricity storage remains prohibitively 
costly, and commercial and residential demand-side 
response is limited. It is worth noting that the proposed 
mechanism can fall back to an energy-only market if a 
different future materialises. That is, if the loss of load 
probability is zero, the premium vanishes. Similarly, 
if storage or demand-side response completely 
eliminates price spikes and increases the average spot 
price, reliability options would lose their value as well. 
Thus, the proposed mechanism is not path-dependent, 
but easily reversible.
In theory, neither the premium nor the reliability 
options distort short-term dispatch incentives. 
However, further research is needed to determine how 
forecast errors by the system operator affect the market, 
i.e., forecast errors in the expected value of lost load, 
expected future capacity need, or marginal cost of the 
most-expensive generation unit. Further research is 
also needed to determine the exact interaction between 
the two mechanisms.
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